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An Examination Of Circadian Impacts On Judgments

By: **David L. Dickinson, Andrew R. Smith,** and **Robert McClelland**

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Many people suffer from insufficient sleep and the adverse effects of sleep deprivation or chronic sleep restriction are well documented. Relatedly, recent research has shown that people's judgments and decisions can be affected by circadian timing. We contributed to this literature by examining time-of-day impact on people's judgments about hypothetical legal scenarios, hypothesizing that participants responding at a suboptimal time of day (3-5 AM) would give higher guilt ratings and be less sensitive to case information (e.g., evidence strength) than participants responding at a more optimal time of day (2-4 PM). Despite the fact that the time-of-day manipulation successfully influenced participants' self-reported alertness levels, the time-of-day did not affect guilt judgments or sensitivity to case information. Exploratory analyses found that chronic daytime sleepiness coupled with suboptimal time-of-day impacted participants' judgments. This adds to the broader literature on how extraneous factors may impact probability assessments, and these results suggest that circadian timing might differentially affect people depending on other contributing factors.

Department of Economics Working Paper

Number 19-11| November 2019

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Abstract

Many people suffer from insufficient sleep and the adverse effects of sleep deprivation or chronic sleep restriction are well documented. Relatedly, recent research has shown that people's judgments and decisions can be affected by circadian timing. We contributed to this literature by examining time-of-day impact on people's judgments about hypothetical legal scenarios, hypothesizing that participants responding at a suboptimal time of day (3-5 AM) would give higher guilt ratings and be less sensitive to case information (e.g., evidence strength) than participants responding at a more optimal time of day (2-4 PM). Despite the fact that the time-of-day manipulation successfully influenced participants' self-reported alertness levels, the time-of-day did not affect guilt judgments or sensitivity to case information. Exploratory analyses found that chronic daytime sleepiness coupled with suboptimal time-of-day impacted participants' judgments. This adds to the broader literature on how extraneous factors may impact probability assessments, and these results suggest that circadian timing might differentially affect people depending on other contributing factors.

Keywords: Sleep deprivation; Circadian mismatch; Judgments; Bayesian choice

An Examination of Circadian Impacts on Judgments

Approximately 30% of U.S. adults sleep less than 6 hours per night (Schoenborn & Adams, 2010) and over 20 million U.S. workers (wage and salary) perform some type of shift work (McMenamin, 2007). Both factors contribute to chronic levels of insufficient sleep, which has been described as a public health problem by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 2015). This problem of chronic sleepiness in society not only affects tens of millions of U.S. adults, but has been documented in developed countries across the globe (Hafner, Stepanek, Taylor, Troxel, & Van Stolk, 2016). Insufficient sleep is related to a variety of negative health, performance, and decision outcomes (for reviews, see Cappuccio, Lanfranco, Strazzullo, & Miller, 2010; Harrison & Horne, 2000; Pilcher & Huffcutt, 1996). Furthermore, and most relevant to the current research, sleep restriction and circadian timing of decision making influences probability judgments and decisions in numerous contexts (e.g., Dickinson & Drummond, 2008; Dickinson & McElroy, 2012; Dickinson & McElroy, 2017).

In the current studies, we examined circadian effects—time-of-day effects—on judgements when multiple sources of information are present. While we use a decision context for our decision stimuli that others have found susceptible to influence by non-essential details or bias (e.g., Danziger, Levav, & Avnaim-Pesso, 2011; Kozinska, 1992), we view our study as relevant to understanding how circadian effects impact judgments more generally. Our studies used a protocol where some people made judgments at a relatively optimal time of day (i.e., during the afternoon) while others made judgments at a more suboptimal time of day (i.e., during the middle of the night). This method approximates the sort of sleepiness-driven deficits in deliberative thinking that are increasingly relevant in a 24/7 world where sleep restriction and suboptimal circadian timing of decisions are common.

As mentioned above, the influence of sleep and circadian timing of decisions on cognitive tasks is well documented (for reviews see Harrison & Horne; 2000; Schmidt, Collette, Cajochen, & Peigneux, 2007). The use of heuristics may provide helpful cognitive short-cuts for decision making when suffering from the cognitive impact of a suboptimal circadian point in time. Past studies have examined the specific question of circadian "mismatch" (suboptimal circadian timing) and decision making (Bodenhausen, 1990; Castillo, Dickinson, & Petrie, 2017; Dickinson & McElroy, 2012; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008; McElroy & Dickinson, 2010). Generally, these studies have concluded that circadian mismatched timing of decisions increases the use of heuristics in decision making and increases risk taking. Thus, there is a reason to believe circadian mismatch may influence many types of judgments in environments of uncertainty.

This research is related to previous studies that examine the impact of sleepiness on Bayesian decision making. In the framework we utilize, legal judgements of guilt or innocence amount to a subjective probability assessment by the decision maker. In a Bayesian environment, judgments are function of both base rate information as well as new evidence. To over- or under-weight either source of information may result in Bayesian inaccurate assessments. Previous evidence has shown that both totally sleep deprived participants (Dickinson & Drummond, 2008) as well as those with voluntary low sleep levels (Dickinson, Drummond, & Dyche, 2016) tend to place less decision weight on new evidence, relative to base rate probability information, in a context-free Bayesian choice task.

While Bayesian framework informed elements of our experiment design, one might hypothesize that judgments where objective probabilities are not quantifiable are made using an alternative approach. For example, individuals may look at the overall body of information and

evidence and perform a type of "maximum likelihood" fitting of narrative to information. In the context of a legal judgment, for example, the perceived state of guilty is chosen if it is more likely to have produced given evidence compared to if the suspect were innocent (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). We note, however, that judgments produced by either mechanism may be empirically indistinguishable because they have the common feature that more information pointing to a particular outcome would increase the probability of rendering a judgment of that outcome. The Bayesian framework is useful in that it allows us to separately examine the impact of different information sources in a quantifiable way.

We built upon the existing research in two ways. First, the current studies examined the impact of adverse circadian timing on probability assessments, whereas past research has focused on sleep levels themselves. Secondly, we will examine decisions in the context-specific domain of guilt assessments in the presence of varied levels of base rate versus evidence information. Individuals ranging from law enforcement to jury members to judges must make assessments of guilt, and so our choice of this context has field relevance. More generally, a better understanding of how a relatively common cognitive state (i.e., circadian mismatched timing of decisions) may impact judgments can help inform policy makers regarding potential systemic biases in such judgments.

Current Studies

To examine time-of-day effects on legal decisions, we experimentally manipulated when participants made judgments by having them complete the study in two parts. In the first online survey, participants completed demographic information and were randomly assigned to one of two times to complete the second online survey. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the second survey at either 2:00 – 4:00 PM or 3:00 – 5:00 AM. The late-night time slot

is considered the circadian "mismatched" time to make decisions. Figure 1 shows the logic

behind the time-of-day conditions, which was intended to maximize the degree of circadian

mismatch for individuals of all diurnal preference types. During the second survey, the

participants read hypothetical scenarios describing a situation where a perpetrator allegedly

committed a crime. After reading the information, the participants rendered a judgment of the

individual's likelihood of guilt.

In Study 1, we hypothesized that participants would give higher guilt ratings to a

"suspect" when sleepy (i.e., completing the survey during the circadian mismatched window of

3:00 – 5:00 AM) relative to when not sleepy (i.e., completing the survey between 2:00 – 4:00

PM). If circadian mismatched individuals are less deliberative and more prone to heuristic

processing (Bodenhausen, 1990; Dickinson & McElroy, 2012; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008), then

they might be more likely to assume that if someone is a suspect, that person likely committed

the crime. In Study 2, we tested two hypotheses. First, we tested the hypothesis that sleepy

participants would be more sensitive to the label used to describe the suspected perpetrator (i.e.,

"suspect" or "person of interest") because they would be more likely to rely on the surface

characteristics, which would require less deliberative thinking. Second, we tested the hypothesis

that sleepy participants would be less sensitive to the strength of evidence presented in the case.

This hypothesis was based on research showing that sleepy participants are less able to carefully

process information (e.g., Martin & Marrington, 2005) or incorporate multiple sources of

information into a probability assessment (Dickinson & Drummond, 2008; Dickinson et al.,

2016).

Study 1

Method

Participants. Participants were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants compensated $1.00 and participants who successfully completed both parts of the survey were entered into a drawing with one participant chosen at random to receive a $50.00 bonus. Two-hundred twelve participants ($M_{age} = 36.35$, $SD_{age} = 10.92$, 57.1% female, 76.4% Caucasian) completed the first survey and 140 participants completed both parts of the survey (see attrition analyses below). A target sample size of at least 100 participants was determined to provide an 80% chance of detecting an effect ($d = .50$) of time-of-day on participants guilt likelihood judgments. The data were not analyzed until all participants completed the survey.

Measures. Participants completed a number of measures related to sleep difficulties and sleep preferences. All measures and manipulations are discussed below. The materials and data files for both studies can be accessed at https://osf.io/f8t47/.

rMEQ. The reduced Morningfulness-Eveningness Questionaire (rMEQ; Adan & Almirall, 1991) is a 5-item measure assessing circadian typology (i.e., diurnal preferences).

ESS. The Epworth Sleep Scale (ESS; Johns, 1991) is an 8-item scale measuring daytime sleepiness.

KSS. The Karolinska Sleepiness Scale (KSS; Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) is a 1-item measure of participants' current-state ("right now") sleepiness measured on a 9-point scale.

Additional sleep-related questions. Participants indicated the average hours of nightly sleep over the past 7 days, the number of hours slept the previous night, the number of hours since they last slept, the number of hours slept during the last time they slept, the optimal amount of sleep they need per night, and whether they had a diagnosed sleep disorder.

Procedure. On MTurk, potential participants were informed that the study was a 2-part study with the second part to be completed during an assigned time. After reading the informed

consent document, the participants completed the first part of the study. Participants were again

informed about the 2-part nature of the study, and then completed demographic questions (i.e.,

gender, ethnicity, racial category, and age), the rMEQ, additional sleep-related questions, KSS,

and ESS. Next, participants were randomly assigned the time block to complete the second part

of the study; participants were assigned to a 3AM-5AM or 2PM-4PM time block. To encourage

completion of the part 2 survey, participants were asked to write down their assigned block and

indicated their plans to ensure they completed the part 2 survey during their assigned time block.

Finally, participants indicated their MTurk worker ID and were given the link to the second

survey.

The part 2 survey started by reminding the participants that they were required to

complete the survey at their assigned time block. The participants were asked to report the

current local time. The survey (hosted on Qualtrics.com) also recorded the time the survey was

completed so we could check for compliance. The participants were asked the additional sleep-

related questions and completed the KSS. The participants were then informed of their task of

making judgments about individuals charged with committing a crime. The participants were

shown a picture of an individual presumably charged with a crime and then given a small amount

of information about the crime (see Appendix A). The participants then indicated the likelihood

that the individual was guilty of the crime on a 0 (definitely not guilty) to 100 (definitely guilty)

point response scale. Next, the participants were asked, in general, how severe the crime is on a 0

(Should not even be a crime) to 100 (Is the worse crime imaginable) point response scale. The

above procedure (read crime description, judge guilt likelihood, judge severity) was repeated for

four suspects charged with assault, underage drinking, breaking and entering, and domestic

abuse. The four suspects were presented in a random order for each participant. After making

the judgments about the four suspects, the participants indicated their MTurk worker ID (so we could link their part 1 and part 2 surveys) and were thanked for their participation.

Results

Attrition. Of the 212 participants who completed the part 1 survey, 140 also completed the part 2 survey (86 in the 2-4 PM condition and 54 in the 3-5 AM condition). To assess for differences between participants who completed both surveys and those who only completed the first, we conducted a linear probability regression prediction of attrition from participants' gender, minority status, age, rMEQ score, ESS score, and time block assignment (see Appendix B). The only factor significantly related to attrition was the time-block assignment where, perhaps not surprisingly, participants were less likely to complete the part 2 survey if assigned to the 3-5AM block (NIGHT) as compared to the 2-4PM block (DAY). Although we had selective attrition (i.e., more attrition at one level of our manipulation relative to the other), there were no differences between people who completed one or both parts of the survey on the variables we measured. To further investigate potential issues with selective attrition, we examined differences between participants completing the part 2 survey at 2-4PM and those completing the part 2 survey at 3-5AM. For this analysis, we focused on the 120 participants who were fully compliant—that is, they completed the part 2 survey during their assigned time.[1] Among compliant participants, 42 were in the NIGHT condition and 78 were in the DAY condition. Linear probability estimates of compliance (see Appendix A) found no significant differences between participants who were compliant and those who were not.

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[1] For a subject to be considered "compliant", we required that the Part 2 survey be initiated no more than 30 minutes before the beginning of one's assigned 2-hour time block and finished no more than 30 minutes after the end of the randomly assigned time block. We also conducted analysis with an alternative strict scoring of compliance (start and finish times entirely within the assigned time block), and our results are not appreciably different.

Manipulation check. As a manipulation check, we examined participants' KSS scores (i.e., their subjective assessments of their sleepiness levels) while completing the part 2 survey at their assigned time. As expected, participants' KSS scores in the NIGHT condition (M = 6.38, SD = 2.15) were significantly higher (i.e., more sleepy) than those of DAY participants (M = 3.41, SD = 1.64), t(118) = 8.95, p < .001, d = 1.74.

Guilt likelihood judgments. To investigate the influence of time-of-day on participants guilt ratings, we conducted a 2 (time-of-day: NIGHT vs. DAY) X 4 (crime: assault, underage drinking, domestic abuse, and breaking and entering) ANOVA on participants' guilt likelihood ratings. Time-of-day was a between-subjects factor and crime was a within-subjects factor. Contrary to our prediction, time-of-day did not influence participants' guilt likelihood judgments, $F(1, 118) = 0.10$, $p = .758$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$. There was a significant main effect of crime, $F(3, 116) = 18.05$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .32$, but no time-of-day X crime interaction, $F(3, 116) = 1.83$, $p = .15$, $\eta_p^2 = .045$. As shown in Figure 2, although the guilt likelihood ratings varied across the four crimes, the ratings did not depend on the time-of-day. Follow-up analyses controlling for age, gender, minority status, rMEQ and ESS scores revealed a similar pattern—no main effect of time-of-day.

We conducted a number of exploratory analyses and two are worth noting. First, we conducted a regression analysis with time of day, ESS, and time-of-day X ESS predicting participants' average guilt likelihood judgment. There was no main effect of time-of-day, t = -0.11, beta = -0.30, p = .911, 95% CI [-5.66, 5.05], and no main effect of Epworth sleepiness (ESS), t = 1.21, beta = .43, p = .23, 95% CI [-0.27, 1.12]. There was, however, a significant time-of-day X ESS interaction, t = 2.17, beta = 1.64, p = .032, 95% CI [.15, 3.13]. When completing the survey during the day, there was no relationship between ESS and guilt ratings, t = -0.35,

beta = -0.15, p = .73, 95% CI [-0.99, 0.69]. During the NIGHT block there was a positive

relationship between ESS and guilt ratings, t = 2.39, beta = 1.49, p = .02, 95% CI [.26, 2.73].

Second, we conducted a 2 (time-of-day) X 4 (crime) X 2 (gender: men vs. women)

ANOVA on participants' guilt likelihood ratings. This analysis again found no main effect of

time-of-day, $F(1, 116) = 0.28$, p = .60, $\eta_p^2 = .002$, and a significant main effect of crime, F(3,

114) = 18.34, p < .001, $\eta_p^2 = .33$. There was no main effect of gender, F(1, 116) = 1.13, p = .29,

$\eta_p^2 = .01$, no crime X gender interaction, F(3, 114) = 1.10, p = .35, $\eta_p^2 = .028$, no crime X time of

day interaction, F(3, 114) = 1.75, p = .16, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, and no crime X gender X time-of-day

interaction, F(3, 114) = 0.42, p = .74, $\eta_p^2 = .01$. Interestingly, there was a significant gender X

time of day interaction, F(1, 116) = 8.49, p = .004, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. Follow-up comparisons revealed

that men gave higher guilt likelihood ratings during the NIGHT condition (M = 57.10, DD =

16.70) as compared to DAY (M = 48.04, SD = 15.07), F(1, 116) = 5.51, p = .021 $\eta_p^2 = .05$.

Women, on the other hand, gave slightly higher guilt likelihood ratings during the DAY

condition (M = 52.90, SD = 12.10) as compared to NIGHT (M = 46.63, SD = 11.35), F(1, 116) =

3.08, p = .08, $\eta_p^2 = .03$.

Discussion

In Study 1, we investigated the influences of time-of-day on guilt likelihood judgments,

with the prediction that participants who were more sleepy would give higher guilt assessments,

in general. Contrary to our prediction, the time-of-day did not influence participants' guilt

likelihood judgments. In a strict sense, we therefore failed to replicate previous research

showing circadian mismatch impacts on choices or judgments (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990;

Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008; McElroy & Dickinson, 2010; Dickinson and McElroy, 2012;

Castillo, Dickinson, & Petrie, 2017). As would be expected, the circadian mismatch

manipulation did influences participants' levels of sleepiness, suggesting that the manipulation was successful. However, this difference in sleepiness did not appear to influence participants' guilt impressions in the legal judgment scenarios. There were, however, two exploratory analyses that revealed interesting patterns. First, the relationship between typical daytime sleepiness (as assessed by ESS) and guilt likelihood judgments was moderated by circadian mismatch; there was no relationship between ESS and guilt likelihood judgments during day (i.e., during the 2-4PM block), but there was a positive relationship between ESS and guilt likelihood judgments at night (i.e., during the 3-5AM block), which may suggest the compounding of adverse sleep states is important. A second exploratory analysis revealed that the influence of circadian mismatch appeared to depend on participants' gender. Specifically, men gave higher guilt likelihood judgments when circadian mismatched, while women gave higher guilt likelihood judgments during the more circadian optimal afternoon times. In order to further investigate these exploratory findings and to address potential limitations of Study 1 (discussed below), we conducted a second study investigating the influence of time-of-day on guilt likelihood judgments.

Study 2

Study 1 found that time-of-day did not influence people's judgments. However, a limitation of Study 1 is that we were not able to assess whether participants attended to the information regarding the legal judgment scenario. If they paid little attention to the information no matter what time of day (e.g., they may have simply anchored on the description of the individual in the scenario as a "suspect"), then one would expect to find no impact of circadian mismatch on judgments. Additionally, the number of participants in the circadian matched versus mismatched treatment conditions was relatively unbalanced in Study 1, with almost twice

as many of the compliant participants in the DAY (N = 78) as compared to the NIGHT (N = 42)

condition. Study 2 addressed each of these concerns.

Method

   Participants. Participants were 861 adults between the ages of 19 and 79 (M = 38.46, SD

= 12.32) recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk. Our sample was 63% female and 26%

minority participants. Participants received a $1.00 payment for completing both surveys and

were entered into drawing for a single $50 bonus payment. While 861 participants completed

the Part 1 survey, 464 completed both parts. Of the 464 who completed both parts of the study,

370 were deemed compliant with 194 of those in the NIGHT condition and 176 in the DAY

condition, representing more balance in the treatment conditions compared to Study 1. Study 2

had a target sample size of 400 participants. The data were not analyzed until all participants

completed the study.

   Design and Procedure. The procedures of Study 2 were very similar to Study 1.

Specifically, the Part 1 survey included demographic and sleep-related questions. At the end of

the Part 1 survey, the participants were randomly assigned to complete the Part 2 survey between

the hours of either 2-4pm (DAY) or 3-5am (NIGHT) during one of the next three days. Each

participant had a 1/3 chance of being assigned to the DAY condition and a 2/3 chance of being

assigned to the NIGHT condition. We assigned twice as many people to the NIGHT condition to

counteract the expected differential attrition observed in Study 1.

   The Part 2 survey elicited guilt assessments from each participant on four distinct legal

scenarios from each subject: breaking and entering, domestic abuse, underage drinking, and

assault. For each scenario we varied two factors. First, the individual in the scenario was either

described as a "person of interest" or as a "suspect." In a sense, this created both a weak and

stronger version of the initial (base rate) information regarding likely guilt. Second, the strength

of the evidence against the suspect was relatively weak or strong. Appendix C shows the exact

scenarios presented to each participant. An important feature of this study is that each participant

was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (suspect + strong evidence; suspect + weak

evidence; person of interest + strong evidence; person of interest + weak evidence)

independently for each scenario. Therefore, a given participants was not guaranteed to be in

each of the four conditions across the four scenarios.

Results and Discussion

Attrition. Appendix D shows results from a linear probability analysis of attrition

likelihood in Study 2, using demographic and sleep measures elicited in the Part 1 survey as

independent variables. Age predicts lower likelihood of attrition from the Part 1 to Part 2 survey

($p < .05$), but the stronger predictor of drop out between parts of the Study 2 protocol is

assignment to the NIGHT condition ($p < .01$). Conditional on completing the Part 2 survey, we

analyzed the probability that the participant was compliant and completed the Part 2 survey

within the randomly assigned time slot in Table B1 (right-hand column). While 80% (370/464)

of our Part 2 survey respondents were compliant, the Table 2 linear probability estimates show

that none of the demographic and sleep measure variables predicted compliance likelihood.

Manipulation Check. We performed a similar test on the different in self-reported

sleepiness scores (KSS scores) to assess the validity of the time-of-day manipulation. As in

Study 1, we report significantly higher KSS scores among participants in the NIGHT condition

($M = 6.28$, $SD = 2.03$) compared to the DAY condition ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.82$), $t(368) = 12.65$, p

$< .001$, $d = 1.32$.

Guilt Assessment. Summary information on guilt assessments are shown in Figure 3, and indicate that participants are generally responsive to information that favors guilt. Because the participants were randomly assigned to a condition independently for each scenario, we constructed a panel data set where each participant made 4 guilt assessment decisions[2]. We then estimated multiple panel data regression models to evaluate predictors of the guilt likelihood rating given by a participant (see Table 1). As independent variables, we included dummy variables for *Suspect* label, *Strong Evidence*, and *NightTime* (*NT*) condition assignment. We also include 2-way interactions as well as the 3-way interaction variable *Suspect*Strong Evidence*NT*. In addition to this set of independent variables, we also estimated a model that includes demographic controls. The error terms in all regressions are clustered at the subject level (4 observations per subject) to correct the standard errors for the non-independence of the error term for a given subject across observations on that subject.

Results in Table 1 show that labeling the alleged perpetrator as a "suspect" rather than "person of interest" significantly increases the likelihood one will rate the individual as guilty (p < .01 in all instances). Similarly, the presentation of stronger evidence increases one assessment of guilt across all estimated models (p < .01 in all instances). Other significant predictors were *Age*, where older participants gave significantly lower guilt assessments (Models (2) and (4), p < .01 in both instances), and *Minority* status of the subject predicted significantly higher guilt

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[2] Running individual 2 (time-of-day) X 2 (evidence strength) X 2 (suspect label) ANOVAs on each of the four crimes leads to similar conclusions as the panel regression analysis. Across all four crimes, there was a main effect of evidence strength such that participants gave higher guilt likelihood ratings when presented with strong relative to weak evidence (ps < .004). Participants gave higher guilt ratings when the suspect was labeled as the "suspect" than "person of interest" abuse (p = .011) and breaking and entering (p = .003), but not assault (p = .595) nor underage drinking (p = .191). Across all four crimes, the time-of-day manipulation did not interact with evidence strength (ps > .23). For three of the crimes suspect label did not interact with time-of-day (ps > .50); for underage drinking, there was a marginally significant suspect label X time-of-day interaction (p = .059) with participants in the day being slightly more influenced by the label than participants at night. Finally, there were no three way interactions (ps > .13). In short, these analyses reveal that evidence strength and—to a slightly lesser extent—suspect label influenced guilt likelihood judgments; the time-of-day did not.

assessments as well (Models (2) and (4), p < .01 in both instances). No significant interactions were estimated and, importantly, we did not find evidence that the time of day manipulation influenced how participants weighed the label (suspect vs. person of interest) or the strength of the crime evidence, contrary to our initial hypothesis.[3] As with our Study 1 results, this represents a failure to replicate some previous results in the literature.

The exploratory analysis from Study 1 motivated a similar exploratory analysis in Study 2. Here, in order to evaluate the interactive effect that the NIGHT condition may have when coupled with high daytime sleepiness scores (Epworth), we include not only an *Epworth*NT* interaction, but we also include the triple interactions between the combined adverse sleep states and the *Suspect* label and *Strong Evidence*. Results are shown in the Appendix E, and we find some results that align with the Study 1 exploratory analysis. For example, we found that *Epworth*NT* significantly increases guilt ratings ($p < .05$). Specifically, there was a positive relationship between Epworth scores and participants' guilt ratings at night, but not during the day (see Appendix F which graphically depicts this interaction effect). Unlike Study 1, gender did not interact with the time-of-day manipulation. That is, there was no *female*NT* interaction.

General Discussion

The current studies were designed to investigate circadian effects on judgments. Across both studies, the time-of-day manipulation successfully influenced participants' self-assessed levels of sleepiness. However, in both studies, the circadian mismatch manipulation represented in the time-of-day conditions did not influence participants' judgments of guilt in the legal

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[3]We also ran similar models of Guilt ratings using self-reported sleepiness ratings during Part 2 as the key regressor (in place of the NT dummy variable). Similarly, it showed that for self-reported sleepier participants, there was no difference in terms of guilt ratings compared to those less sleepy (results available on request).

scenarios we examined. One possible explanation for the lack of an effect is that very few of the

participants carefully attended to the information about the crimes. Therefore, reduced alertness

during the mismatched time would have no effect. However, the results of Study 2 suggest that

participants were processing the information about the crimes, as evidenced by their sensitivity

to the evidence strength and suspect label. The results of Study 2 are consistent with a Bayesian

type of decision process, where participants' judgments were a positive function of both the

evidence strength and the suspect label (i.e., "suspect" vs. "person of interest"). Contrary to our

hypothesis, we found no evidence that participants at more suboptimal times-of-day weighted the

information sources differently compared to those at a more optimal time-of-day. These results

fail to replicate other studies in the more general literature on circadian mismatch and decision

making (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Castillo, Dickinson, & Petrie, 2017; Dickinson & McElroy,

2012; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008; McElroy & Dickinson, 2010). Also, our findings did not

replicate previous more-related research results on circadian mismatch and judgment. This

suggests that, at least in some situations, the negative influence of sleep restrictions might not be

as detrimental as has been previously documented regarding judgments. That said, caution

should be taken in this conclusion because of certain limitations.

The task paradigm we chose is one where there is no objectively correct answer to the

decision scenarios, contrary to previous Bayesian tasks administered to sleepy participants.

Specifically, our judgment scenarios did not involve easily quantifiable information that could

produce an objective probability of a given outcome, which may be a critical discriminating

feature in some judgment environments. More qualitative decision environments may therefore

not be affected by sleepiness the same as environments where accuracy can be quantified and

objectively measured (e.g., Dickinson & Drummond, 2008). Also, this same feature of our

design resulted in a decision paradigm where participants could not be incentivized to identify the correct answer. If monetary incentives engage circadian mismatched participants differentially than circadian matched subjects then our study is limited by having a non-consequential decision environment. One final limitation worth noting is the limited variation in the levels of our two key information factors. We examined two levels of both the evidence and the descriptive label that identified the individual. Other Bayesian tasks might vary the strength of base rate or new evidence information in a more continuous fashion that would have statistical power advantages.

While these limitations may help explain our non-replication of some previous results, they give indications of potential new research directions and highlight the need to reiterate our contribution with these studies. We administered a circadian mismatch protocol that represents a notable improvement over past protocols. Previous studies assessed diurnal preferences and assigned mismatch (i.e., suboptimal time-of-day for decisions) based on a median split of the morningness-eveningness preference scores (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Kruglanski & Pierro, 2008). In addition to smaller samples in these previous studies, the process of dictating morning-type versus evening-type based on a median is problematic given that the young adult populations used likely contained no more than 10% true morning-type participants (see Chelminski et al, 2000). Thus, our approach was to use an online study such that we could exploit a more clear suboptimal time-of-day in our 3-5am NIGHT condition. In this way, individuals of any diurnal preference type would be at a more circadian mismatched state if assigned to the NIGHT condition (see Figure 1).

We are confident in the validity of our circadian mismatch protocol, which was assessed with the commonly used Karolinska 9-point sleepiness scale (Åkerstedt & Gillberg, 1990) that

has shown high validity as a measure of subjective sleepiness (Kaida et al., 2006). However, the

extreme time of night we used in our design also led to sample selection. This further implies

that our results would tend to underestimate the true effect of a circadian mismatch, but

alternative methodologies to reduce this concern are difficult to implement outside of a sleep

laboratory environment. In sum, while we did not find evidence for circadian mismatch effects

on legal judgments in our paradigm, we feel this result is important and this area of research is

worth continued study given the concerns over sleepiness in modern society. Indeed, this

research may motivate further study on the likely impact of insufficient sleep or sleep

deprivation in similar decision settings.[4]

 Finally, we noted that our exploratory analysis are suggestive of the possibility that

compounded sleep states may yet produce significant differences in qualitative judgments in our

participants. Both exploratory analyses in Studies 1 and 2 indicated that participants having

higher levels of daytime sleepiness (ESS levels) gave higher guilt ratings if in the circadian

mismatched condition. These results are consistent with previous research showing that certain

circadian mismatch effects may manifest when combined with another adverse sleep state

(Dickinson & McElroy, 2010). This exploratory find is noteworthy, however, given that the

variation in ESS daytime sleepiness levels found in young adult populations would imply, in at

least certain legal scenarios, a significant increase in guilt judgments of about 10-15 percentage

points for circadian mismatched individuals using the parameter estimates in our study.[5]

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[4] For example, Dickinson and McElroy (2017) recently investigated the impact of both mild chronic sleep restriction and circadian mismatch on social decisions and found that the impact of sleep restriction on sleepiness was greater than the (still significant) effect of circadian mismatch on sleepiness. Thus, this research question may be worth further exploration under conditions of common levels of insufficient sleep, which may produce more significant effects if such an adverse sleep effect impact sleepiness more severely.

[5] For example, Dickinson et al (2018) find ESS mean levels at 8.05 (± 3.63) and 7.93 (± 3.83) in two samples of college students (n=2218) and mTurk workers (n=992), respectively. This difference of 7-8 ESS points (2 standard deviations) from low to high values of the ESS distribution implies this 10-15 percentage point difference in

A common finding is that people's evaluation of information is influenced by their level of sleepiness and/or the time of day of decision making (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1990; Castillo et al., 2017; Dickinson & Drummond, 2008; Dickinson & McElroy, 2010, 2012). However, using a novel circadian mismatch protocol, we failed to replicate that general result—we found no evidence that suboptimal circadian timing influenced participants' assessments of guilt when evaluating hypothetical crime scenarios. We, of course, are not suggesting that suboptimal circadian timing will never influence people's judgments—quite the opposite. Our studies simply indicate that factors might moderate the influence of circadian impacts on judgments. The present study examined guilt perceptions where no objective assessment of decision accuracy was possible and the exploratory analysis suggested that more significant adverse sleep states may yet impact judgments in such qualitative assessment environments. Our hope is that this attempt to more systematically study the impact of the commonly experienced state of "sleepiness", in general, on judgments will stimulate additional research in this area.

perceived guilt for *NIGHT Treatment* participants using the estimated significant coefficients on the interaction term *Epworth*NT* across models in Appendix E.

Open Practices

Materials and data for the studies described in this manuscript are available at

https://osf.io/f8t47/.

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
Figure 1. Typical alertness by time-of-day and chronotype. Graph reproduced from Figure 2 in

Dickinson et al. (2017) and was adapted from alertness levels in Figure 1 in Smith et al. (2002).

*Figure 2*. Average guilt likelihood judgments in Study 1. Error bars represent ±1 SE.

Figure 3. Average guilt likelihood judgments in Study 2, pooled across crimes. Error bars

represent ±1 SE.

Table 1

Guilt likelihood judgments in Study 2 predicted by perpetrator label, evidence strength, time-of-day, and demographic variables.

Dep Var=Likelihood of Guilt	Coefficient (st error) (1)	Coefficient (st error) (2)
Constant	36.051**	43.618**
	(1.718)	(3.524)
Suspect label (=1)	8.344**	8.138**
	(2.119)	(2.131)
Strong Evidence (=1)	14.170**	14.301**
	(2.157)	(2.164)
Suspect*Strong Evid	-4.971	-5.146
	(2.820)	(2.841)
Night treatment (NT=1)	0.844	0.459
	(2.574)	(2.475)
Suspect*NT	-4.490	-3.893
	(2.990)	(3.002)
Strong Evid*NT	-0.592	-0.459
	(3.090)	(3.076)
Suspect*Strong Evid*NT	3.504	3.265
	(4.187)	(4.188)
Female (=1)		-1.187
		(1.747)
Minority (=1)		5.833**
		(2.165)
Age (in years)		-0.236**
		(0.069)
Epworth score)		0.162
		(0.264)
Chi-Squared	140.450**	178.282**
N	1479	1479

*.05, **.01 for one-tailed test. Results are similar if analysis is restricted to subset of data of self reported "severe" crimes (i.e., severity rating > 50 on [0,100] scale)

Appendix A

Legal Judgment Scenario text—STUDY 1:

Assault

The suspect (pictured above) has been charged with assaulting another person. The victim of the assault was attacked after he exited a local grocery store. None of the victim's possessions were stolen, but he did need to go to the emergency room to treat a number of cuts and bruises. The suspect was taken into custody by the police when he was walking around the grocery store. The victim claims that the person who assaulted him was wearing a mask and is unable to identify the person who attacked him. The suspect says he does not know the victim. The suspect has been cooperative with law enforcement officers.

Underage drinking

The suspect (pictured above) has been charged with underage drinking. The suspect is 20 years old and has not previously been charged with underage drinking. The suspect attended a party where alcoholic beverages were served. Multiple witnesses indicated that the suspect appeared to be intoxicated while at the party, but none reported seeing him drink alcohol. The suspect said that he likely appeared impaired because he did not get enough sleep.

Domestic abuse

The suspect (pictured above) has been charged with physically abusing her spouse. The suspect has not previously been charged with a violent crime. One of the suspect's previous romantic partners reported that they often got into heated arguments. However, none of the suspect's previous romantic partners reported any physical abuse by the suspect. The suspect denies the charges, but does admit that she was physically abused as a child.

Breaking and Entering

The suspect (pictured above) has been charged with breaking and entering. The suspect has not been arrested for breaking and entering in the past. The suspect lives several miles away from the location where the crime occurred. The suspect comes from a low income household and is currently unemployed. The suspect admits that he was near the location where the crime occurred, but he has denied any wrongdoing.

Appendix B

STUDY 1—Linear Probability Models
Attrition & Compliance

Variable	Dep Var=Attrition Coefficient (st error)	Dep Var=Compliant Coefficient (st error)
Constant	.138	.946**
	(.173)	(.158)
Female (=1)	.105	.023
	(.065)	(.061)
Minority (=1)	-.034	-.100
	(.077)	(.069)
Age (in years)	-.003	.001
	(.003)	(.003)
Epworth score	-.006	-.016
	(.009)	(.008)
rMEQ	.012	.002
	(.008)	(.007)
Night treatment (NT=1)	.247	-.110
	(.034)**	(.031)
R-Squared	212	140
N	.0959	.0923

*.05, **.01 for two-tailed test. rMEQ is reduced morningness-eveningness score (higher values indicate morning preference). Epworth scores measure chronic daytime sleepiness.

Appendix C
Legal Judgment Scenario text—STUDY 2:

<u>Perpetrator label information:</u>
"person of interest"
The individual pictured--call him "John Doe"--is a person of interest in the crime of assaulting another person, but no charges have been filed.   You will be given additional information regarding the crime on the next screen.

"suspect"
The individual pictured--call him "John Doe"--is a suspect who has been formally charged with the crime of assaulting another person, and is awaiting trial. You will be given additional information regarding the crime on the next screen.

<u>Evidence information</u>
ASSAULT--Additional Crime Information (WEAK EVIDENCE):
The victim of the assault was attacked after he exited a local grocery store. None of the victim's possessions were stolen, but he did need to go to the emergency room to treat a number of cuts and bruises. John Doe was questioned by the police when he was walking around the grocery store. The victim claims that the person who assaulted him was wearing a mask and is unable to identify the person who attacked him. John Doe says he does not know the victim, and John Doe has been cooperative with law enforcement officers.

ASSAULT--Additional Crime Information (STRONG EVIDENCE):
The victim of the assault was attacked after he exited a local grocery store. None of the victim's possessions were stolen, but he did need to go to the emergency room to treat a number of cuts and bruises. John Doe was taken into custody by the police when he was walking around the grocery store. The victim claims that the person who assaulted him was wearing a mask and is unable to identify the person who attacked him. The police found a mask in John Doe's vehicle, but John Doe says he does not know the victim. John Doe has been clearly frustrated by the police questioning him.

UNDERAGE DRINKING--Additional Crime Information (WEAK EVIDENCE):
John Doe is 20 years old and has <u>not</u> previously been charged with underage drinking. John Doe attended a party, but it unclear whether or not alcoholic beverages were served. One witness indicated that John Doe appeared to be impaired while at the party, but the witness did did not see him drink alcohol. John Doe said that he likely appeared impaired because he did not get enough sleep.

UNDERAGE DRINKING--Additional Crime Information (STRONG EVIDENCE):
John Doe is 20 years old and has <u>not</u> previously been charged with underage drinking. John Doe attended a party where alcoholic beverages were served. Multiple witnesses indicated that the suspect appeared to be intoxicated while at the party, though no one reported actually seeing him drink alcohol. The suspect said that he likely appeared impaired because he did not get enough sleep.

DOMESTIC ABUSE--Additional Crime Information (WEAK EVIDENCE):
Jane Doe has not previously been charged with a violent crime. One of Jane Doe's previous romantic partners reported that they sometimes argued. However, none of Jane Doe's previous romantic partners reported any physical abuse from her. Jane Doe denies the charges, but does admit that she was physically abused as a child.

DOMESTIC ABUSE--Additional Crime Information (STRONG EVIDENCE):
Jane Doe has not previously been charged with a violent crime. One of Jane Doe's previous romantic partners reported that they sometimes argued and Jane Doe once broke a dish out of anger. None of Jane Doe's previous romantic partners reported any physical abuse from her, but one mentioned Jane was prone to extreme jealousy. Jane Doe denies the charges, but does admit that she was physically abused as a child.

BREAKING AND ENTERING--Additional Crime Information (WEAK EVIDENCE):
John Doe has not been arrested for breaking and entering in the past. John Doe lives many miles away from the location where the crime occurred. John Doe comes from a low income household and is currently unemployed. The suspect admits that he was near the location where the crime occurred, but he has denied any wrongdoing. John Doe has been cooperative with law enforcement.

BREAKING AND ENTERING--Additional Crime Information (STRONG EVIDENCE):
John Doe has not been arrested for breaking and entering in the past, but he was convicted of a misdemeanor 4 years ago. John Doe lives quite close to the location where the crime occurred. John Doe comes from a low income household and is currently unemployed. A witness states she saw John Doe near the location where the crime occurred, but John Doe has denied any wrongdoing.

Appendix D

STUDY 2—Linear Probability Models
Attrition & Compliance

Variable	Dep Var=Attrition Coefficient (st error)	Dep Var=Compliant Coefficient (st error)
Constant	0.241**	0.741**
	(0.082)	(0.092)
Female (=1)	0.032	-0.031
	(0.033)	(0.039)
Minority (=1)	-0.059	-0.051
	(0.038)	(0.044)
Age (in years)	-0.003*	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.002)
Epworth score	0.002	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)
rMEQ	0.006	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Night treatment (NT=1)	0.345**	-0.044
	(0.034)	(0.038)
R-Squared	0.1126	0.0199
N	861	464

*.05, **.01 for two-tailed test. rMEQ is reduced morningness-eveningness score (higher values indicate morning preference). Epworth scores measure chronic daytime sleepiness.

Appendix E

Guilt Ratings—STUDY 2 (additional interactions)

Dep Var=Likelihood of Guilt	Coefficient (st error)	Coefficient (st error)
	(1)	(2)
Constant	36.933**	45.994**
	(3.182)	(4.361)
Suspect label (=1)	8.360**	8.200**
	(2.124)	(2.141)
Strong Evidence (=1)	14.170**	14.278**
	(2.161)	(2.177)
Suspect*Strong Evid	-4.976	-5.125
	(2.824)	(2.851)
Night treatment (NT=1)	-10.254*	-8.641
	(5.092)	(5.502)
Suspect*NT	2.216	-0.101
	(5.291)	(5.954)
Strong Evid*NT	7.581	9.179
	(5.184)	(5.913)
Suspect*Strong Evid*NT	-2.947	-4.182
	(7.759)	(8.891)
Epworth score	-0.138	-0.275
	(0.399)	(0.388)
Epworth*NT	1.620*	1.629*
	(0.680)	(0.652)
Epworth*NT*Suspect	-0.988	-1.056
	(0.614)	(0.599)
Epworth*NT*Strong Evid	-1.201*	-1.124
	(0.603)	(0.597)
Epworth*NT*Suspect*Strong Evid	0.958	1.016
	(0.947)	(0.910)
Female (=1)		-0.410
		(2.447)
Minority (=1)		5.717**
		(2.151)
Age (in years)		-0.238**
		(0.070)
Female*NT		-2.997
		(4.501)
Female*NT*Suspect		6.069
		(4.257)
Female*NT*Evid Strong		-2.937
		(4.541)
Female*NT*Suspect*Evid Strong		0.009
		(6.426)
Chi-Squared	155.719**	197.141**
N	1479	1479

Note: errors clustered on individual: *.05, **.01 for the two-tailed test

Appendix F

Interaction effect for "PERSON OF INTEREST" and "weak evidence"

Note: Forecast based on coefficients from Appendix E guilt ratings.